The plan to make Trinidad and Tobago Israel's primary Caribbean partner

Trinidad and Tobago will take a seat on the United Nations Security Council on 1 January with something few small states possess: 181 votes behind it, a two-year diplomatic window ahead of it and a physical position that gives larger powers reason to keep paying attention after the term ends.1

The proposition now being explored around Israel uses that window to build something more durable. One track would deepen the bilateral relationship through political consultation, technology, investment, connectivity and security cooperation. The other would establish permanent Jewish communal infrastructure in Port of Spain. Together, they would make Trinidad and Tobago Israel's most consequential Caribbean relationship and turn the capital into a Jewish centre for the southern Caribbean.

That case begins with a map. Trinidad lies about seven miles from Venezuela at the closest point, across a narrow maritime frontier fixed by treaty coordinates. This is not simply proximity to South America. The boundary passes through an energy system in which reservoirs, companies, pipelines and political permissions connect the two states beneath the sea.217

The frontier beneath the water

Loran–Manatee is the largest expression of that connection: roughly 10 trillion cubic feet of gas across the maritime line, commonly divided in published estimates between about 7.3 tcf on Venezuela's Loran side and 2.7 tcf on Trinidad and Tobago's Manatee side. Shell took its final investment decision on Manatee in July 2024. The field is intended to feed Atlantic LNG, with first gas targeted for 2027.3

Manakin–Cocuina gives the relationship a different legal form. In August, the National Gas Company acquired a 20 per cent participating interest in bpTT's Block 5(b), where Manakin sits, aligning it with NGC's 20 per cent position in Venezuela's Cocuina licence. NGC describes it as the Western Hemisphere's only unitised cross-border gas reservoir with agreement to develop the whole resource.4

Dragon lies in Venezuelan waters. Its commercial logic nevertheless points west-to-east into Trinidad's system: NGC and Shell signed the exploration and production licence with Venezuela in December 2023 as part of the effort to export Venezuelan gas to Trinidad and Tobago.5

The distinction is industrial. Atlantic LNG at Point Fortin, the Point Lisas estate, pipelines, ports, ammonia and methanol plants mean that gas reaching Trinidad enters an existing processing and export economy. The Government said in August that regional arrangements could position the country to monetise more than 12 tcf through that infrastructure. The same development brought bp together with Abu Dhabi's XRG and Qatar's UCC around Venezuelan acreage, placing Gulf capital in the same energy geography.6

For Israel, this is a relationship with a Caribbean state whose relevance touches Venezuela, regional gas supply, Gulf investment and global LNG. Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Lucia, Cayman, Curaçao and Guyana each possess parts of that picture. Trinidad and Tobago is the place where the parts converge.

Washington's half-billion-dollar marker

The United States is making a long-term commitment of its own. Its embassy has announced an investment exceeding US$500 million to plan, design and build a new compound in Port of Spain. The project occupies the former Trinidad Country Club site in Maraval and is scheduled through 2029—beyond the end of the Security Council term.7

An embassy is permanent diplomatic infrastructure. Its scale signals that Washington expects Port of Spain to remain important through changes of government, energy cycles and Council membership. The compound sits on the Caribbean island facing Venezuela while Washington and Port of Spain deepen their security and energy engagement.

The relationship that accelerated in 2026

Mattanya Aharon Cohen presented credentials on 5 February as Israel's non-resident ambassador, based in Panama. In April, High Court orders placed Hizballah, Hamas and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Trinidad and Tobago's consolidated list under the Anti-Terrorism Act and froze property connected to the listed entities.810

In July, Cohen and Eynat Shlein, director-general of MASHAV, met Planning Minister Kennedy Swaratsingh. The published agenda covered modern agriculture, education, cybersecurity, smart cities, climate resilience, institutional capacity, public-private partnerships and support for smaller businesses. This was a working development agenda, broad enough to move the relationship beyond protocol.9

In September, Trinidad and Tobago remained in the General Assembly chamber during Benjamin Netanyahu's address while delegates from a number of states walked out. Ambassador Neil Parsan said the delegation's practice was to hear every speaker and reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement. The decision nevertheless became part of the visible record of a relationship growing more active.11

The next layer is being explored. A structured political consultation mechanism, possible air links, investment protection, expanded technology partnerships and deeper police and security engagement belong to the developing bilateral agenda. Their significance lies in the architecture they could create: recurring channels through which the relationship can continue after the present diplomatic moment.

Building a Jewish centre in Port of Spain

The communal proposal starts from a small but living base. The Commonwealth Jewish Council estimates that between 25 and 65 Jewish people live in Trinidad and Tobago and identifies B'nai Shalom as the community organisation. Jewish Telegraphic Agency reporting has recorded the absence of a synagogue and the community's reliance on private gathering and support from elsewhere in the region.1213

The plan would give that community a permanent home: suitable premises in Port of Spain, resident religious leadership, dependable Friday-night dinner and Saturday lunch, kosher provision, a Torah, a mikveh and High Holiday services sustained locally. Each element answers a practical need. Together they form an institution capable of serving residents, visitors, diplomats and businesspeople moving through the southern Caribbean.

Trinidad already has a Jewish history substantial enough to support that future. Portuguese and Sephardic families, links with Curaçao, Sir Nathaniel Nathan and refugees from Europe form part of the record. By 1939 the population had reached about 600. The community maintained a synagogue on Duke Street, and Jewish graves at Mucurapo preserve the physical memory of the people later known as the Calypso Jews.12

Even the six-pointed star worn in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service has become part of the relationship's visual vocabulary. The emblem is established; its origin remains a matter of competing historical accounts. A 1985 Jewish Telegraphic Agency report described the popular story that a Jewish police chief introduced it as apocryphal. The symbol's value here is the documented connection it has carried in public life, rather than a single settled provenance.14

The proposal also enters a country where Israel and Palestine are live political questions. UWI's Institute of International Relations cancelled a September webinar with former Israeli ambassador Ephraim Ben Matityahu after objections from student and Muslim organisations, citing the intensity surrounding the conflict. Trinidad and Tobago recognised Palestine in 2024 and continues to support a two-state settlement.15

That domestic setting makes the institutional design more important. A Jewish centre built as part of Trinidad and Tobago's plural religious landscape can support worship, culture, history and hospitality while the state conducts its diplomacy according to its own foreign policy. Its durability would come from local relationships and recurring communal life.

The opening and the proposition

The Security Council term supplies urgency, access and visibility. The permanent case lies elsewhere: Trinidad's geography beside Venezuela; cross-border gas; the route from Venezuelan fields into Atlantic LNG and Point Lisas; Gulf participation around those assets; a major new American diplomatic compound; and an Israeli relationship already widening into development and security policy.

The strategic proposition is to use 2027 and 2028 as the period in which those strands are tied together. For Israel, Trinidad and Tobago offers a sovereign Caribbean partner at the junction of the islands and South America, with infrastructure and diplomatic reach beyond its size. For Port of Spain, a permanent Jewish house would restore an institutional presence the city once sustained and give the relationship roots beyond government.

A Council term ends. A maritime frontier, an energy system and a community remain. The plan is to build for what remains.